They had 47 global admins

Lack of discipline & organizational drift

When one credential was compromised, the attacker did not need to escalate privileges.

They already had them.

There was no lateral movement strategy.
No complex privilege chain.
No need to identify a higher-value account.

The authority was built into the role.

In Microsoft 365, a global administrator can control identity, reset passwords, assign roles, access data, modify security settings, and effectively redefine the control framework of the tenant.

Forty-seven individuals held that authority.

Not because forty-seven were required.
Because access had accumulated.

Over time, elevated rights were granted to accelerate projects, simplify support, and remove bottlenecks. Few were ever reassessed. Fewer were removed.

Privilege growth is rarely intentional. It is incremental. Each decision appears reasonable in isolation.

Collectively, it becomes exposure.

For executive leadership, this is not an operational convenience issue. It is risk concentration at scale. Every additional global administrator increases the probability of credential compromise, insider misuse, configuration error, and audit scrutiny.

Least privilege is not a theoretical principle.
It is a discipline.

It requires:

Clearly defined role boundaries
Segregation of duties
Time-bound elevation where possible
Continuous review of administrative roles
Accountability tied to business justification

Without discipline, organizations drift.
Access expands.
Oversight weakens.
Exposure compounds.

Most breaches do not occur because attackers are exceptionally sophisticated.

They occur because too many people have too much power.

Concerned about the scale of privileged access in your M365 environment? Contact us for a confidential review of administrative exposure and governance discipline.

Reference cases - why it matters

1. Twitter Internal Tools Breach (2020)

In 2020, attackers compromised internal systems at Twitter after gaining access to employee accounts through social engineering.

The attackers reached internal administrative tools that allowed them to:

• control user accounts
• reset credentials
• post messages from high-profile accounts

These capabilities were used to hijack accounts belonging to figures such as Elon Musk, Barack Obama, and Bill Gates.

Relevance

The breach escalated rapidly because internal administrative capabilities were accessible once employee accounts were compromised.

Attackers did not need complex privilege escalation — the administrative power was already available.

Contact us if you do NOT have automated visibility, control and remediation of your M365 admin. landscape?

2. Colonial Pipeline Ransomware Attack (2021)

The ransomware attack against Colonial Pipeline was initiated through a single compromised VPN account.

The credentials reportedly belonged to an employee account that no longer required access but remained active.

Once inside the network, attackers linked to the DarkSide ransomware group were able to move quickly through the environment.

The incident led to:

• shutdown of the largest fuel pipeline in the United States
• widespread fuel shortages across multiple states

Relevance

The breach demonstrated how over-provisioned or poorly managed access accounts increase exposure.

Contact us if you do NOT have automated visibility, control and remediation of your M365 admin. landscape?

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